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Summary  findings
The  finaricial  systems  in most  developing  countries  today  countries  have created  institutions  that  specialize  in
have  nianv  features  in common  with  the financial  systems  lending  to the poor,  but  more  must  be done  to help  these
of the developing  countries  of the  eighteenth  and  institutions  reach  the  poor  in rural  areas  and assist  small
nineteenrh  centuries.  Whether  they  had  unlimited  farmers,  artisans,  and traders.
liability  (as in Scotland  in the eighteenth  century),  or  An integrated  program  to build  solid  institutions
limited  liability  and  special  charters,  commercial  banks  requires  five elements  for success:
dorninated  EUropean  and  U.S. financial  systems.  Strong  leadership.  (Support  should  be given to
Moreover,  they were  typically  established  by wealthy  groups,  such  as the  Church  or  local officials,  likely  to
people  and  oriented  toward  businesses  and other  wealthy  attract  people  with  integrity,  high  ideals,  and
people  --  they  effectively  represented  "banking  for the  commitment  to  the institution's  success.)
rich by the  rich."  Insurance  companies  were  *  A three-tier  structure.
underdeveloped  and pension  and mutual  funds did  not  *  Strong  emphasis  on education  and  the dissemination
yet exist.  As a result,  middle-  and  low-income  people  had  of information  about  the workings  and benefits  of the
limited  access to formal  financial  services  and  relied  on  institution.  (Culture  can  be an  obstacle  to a thrift
informal  arrangemenCTts  for borrowing.  Meanwhile,  institution's  success,  as the  Irish  experience  shows.)
financial  savings  were  unproductively  hoarded  under  the  - An official  policy  that  encourages  self-help  and
mattress.  avoids  total  reliance  on external  funding.  External
In developing  counitries  today  this gap  in the provision  support  could  be made  dependent  on local  resource
of financial  services  can  be explained  by the  low  level  mobilization  and  a record  of monitoring  and  repayment.
a.nd uneqJual distributioni  of income  and  wealth,  high  *  Most  important,  the encouragement  of active  peer
information  and  transaction  costs,  and  weak  enforcement  monitoring  and  the enforcement  of contractual
mechanisnis.  In Furope  and  the  United  States,  over time,  obligations.  The  principle  of unlimited  liability  may not
differenit  types of  institutions  -including  savings  banks,  be viable  in most  developing  countries,  but  government
k  rtdit  cooperatives,  building  societies,  and  credit  unions  could  support  only  regional  units  and  local  institutions
emerged  to fil! this  marke(t gap.  Many  developing  that  have a good  record  of loan  repayment.
Ifhis papcr  - a jorint product  of the  Finance  and Private  Sector  Development  Division,  Policy  Research  Department,  arid
Financial  Sector  l)evelopment  Department  - was presented  at a Bank seminar,  "Financial  History:  Lessons of the Past for
Refornmers of the Present,"  and is a chapter  in a forthcoming  volume,  ReformirngFinatice:  SomeLessonsfromn  Histo,y,  edited
bv Gerard  Caprio,  Jr. and [)imitri  Vittas.  Copies  of this paper  are available  free from  the World  Bank,  1818 H Street  N9C;.
Waslhlngtoi,  D)C 204  3.  Please contact  Priscilla  Infante,  room  (x8-115,  telephone  202-473-7642,  fax  202-522-3  19.,
Interniet address  pinfarite(s  worldbank.org.  November  1995.  (53 pages)
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TableThe financial  systems  in most developing  countries  today  have  many  features  in common  with the financial
systems  of the developing  countries  of the eighteenth  and nineteenth  centuries. Whether  they had unlimited
liability (as in Scotland in the eighteenth  century),  double liability  (as in the United States in the late
nineteenth century), or  limited liability and special charters, commercial  bankls  were the dominant
institutions  in the financial  systems  of European  countries  and the United  States. Moreover,  they were
typically  established  by wealthy  people  and oriented  toward businesses  and other wealthy people-they
effectively  represented  "banking  for the rich by the rich." Insurance  companies  were underdeveloped  and
pension  and mutual  funds  did not yet exist. As a result  middle-  and low-income  people  had limited  access
to formal financial  services  and relied on infornal arrangements  for borrowing. Meanwhile,  financial
savinas  were unproductively  hoarded  under  the  mattress.
In developing  countries  today  this gap in the provision  of financial  services  can be explained  by the
lowv  level and unequal  distribution  of income  and wealth,  high information  and transaction  costs, and weak
enforcement  mechanisms. But over time, different  types of institutions,  including  savings banks, credit
cooperatives,  building  societies,  and credit unions,  emerged  in the United  States  and Europe  to overcome
these problems  and fill this market  gap. This chapter  gives a brief historical  review  of the emergence  and
evolution of thrift deposit institutions  in Europe and the United States and draws lessons for today's
developing countries.2
-.  The  term thrift deposit  institutioni  is used  to distinguish  these  bank-like  institutions  from the mutual
insuiranice  companies  that have  also encouraged  thrift and played  a large part in the evolution  of financial
IThe Origin of Thrift Deposit Institutions
Several types of thrift deposit institutions developed and their ownership, functions, and orientation differed
substantially across countries and  across types of institutions.  Some institutions were established  as
publicly owned units, others were mutually owned by their members, and others were set up as foundations.
Some institutions focused on mobilizing deposits from low- and middle-income groups and holding them
in government debt.  This pattern was followed by postal savings banks in all countries and by ordinary
,~ 
savinas banks in countries (such as the United Kingdom and France) where government regulation required
them to invest all their deposit funds in government debt.  In still other countries, such as Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States, savings banks were allowed to lend to firms
and households (although in the United States regulations differed from state to state).  Credit cooperatives
were set up by farmers in rural areas and by artisans and small traders in urban areas.  Their main purpose
was to mobilize resources for  lending to their members.  Finally, building societies, savings and  loan
associations, and credit unions specialized in raising deposits from houselholds  and then lending the funds
back to them for housing finance and consumer credit needs.
The heyday of thrift deposit institutions was probably the mid-1970s.  In the past twenty years
pension funds and mutual funds have become very important in the financial systems of many countries.
As a result, the relative importance of both commercial banks and thrift deposit institutions has declined.
Although pension funds and mutual funds are similar in many respects-their  members share in the returns
and costs of their operation-their  modes of operation  are quite different.
systems.  The achievements and shortcomings of mutual insurance companies have mirrored those of
thrift deposit institutions.
2In addition to the growth of tihese  institutions, the industrial world has also Nvitnessed  a process of
"demutualization,"  whereby highly profitable and successful institutions  have converted to stock ownership.
These  conversions have  takeii place on  top of  the takeovers and  conversions of  failed  instituitionls.
especially in the United States in the wake of the savings and  loan debacle.  These conversions have
contributed to the relative decline of thrift deposit institutions.
The conversion of mutual  savings and loan  associations and  mutual savings bankis into stock
institutions  has  been  very  extensive  in  the  United  States,' dating  from  at  least  the  early  1960s.
Demutualization of building societies began in the l9SOs and has progressed farthest in Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa, and is nowv  spreading in the United Kingdom.  The demnutualization  of mutual
insurance companies has also begun to take place in the United States, the United Kingdom, and otier
countries.  Continental Europe and Japan have not yet followed this trend, altioughl the pressures on
mutuals are growing in all countries.
Conversions and demutualizations are taking place at this juncture for several reasons. They reflect
the need to finance expansion with external capital, particularly in new areas of business in which mutual
institutions are diversifying awvay  from their traditional operations. They-also reflect the fact that in most of
these institutions, mutuality has long become a myth-most  of their "owners" do not see themselves as
members of a movement but rather as customers of well-established financial institutions.  And, finally,
they reflect the opportunistic behavior of managers wvho  more often than not are the main beneficiaries of
conversions.  Whatever the combination of reasons in different countries, recent trends identify the mid-
1970s as the heyday of thrift deposit institutions.
Internationally comparable data on the relative size of thrift  deposit institutions are not readily
available.  A study conducted in the late 1970s on the deposits and other liabilities with the nonfinancial
sector showed that thrift deposit institutions accounted for between one-third and one-half of total liabilities
3with  the nonfinancial  sector in  Germany, France, Italy,  and Japan-all  countries in  which  insurance
companies and pension funds played a very small part in the financial system (at the time).  But even in the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where institutional investors
were more  developed, thrift  deposit  institutions accounted  for between one-fifth and  one-third of  all
financial sector liabilities (table 9.1). Also, the share of large commercial banks was not very large even in
countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden, where banking concentration was very high.
In the United Kingdom and the United States, buildingasocieties  and savings and loan associations
played an important role, but credit cooperatives did not emerge, and savings banks accounted for small
shares of all resources mobilized (table 9.1).  In contrast, savings banks were very large in Germany and
Switzerland and only slightly smaller in Italy, Sweden, and France.  Credit cooperatives were large in
Japan,  France, and the Netherlands and to  a  lesser extent Germany and  Italv.  Postal savings banks,
including postal giros, were more important in France than in Japan, but they were also very large in Italy
and the Netherlands.  Finally, credit unions were large, at  least as formal institutions, only in the United
States. 3
Why did thrift deposit institutions emerge in most European countries and the United States and
how were they able to grow and acquire suchl importance in the financial systems of so many countries?
What was their contribution to financial sector development and most broadly to economic development?
And  what  is their  relevance for  the  financial systems of developing countries, many  of which  have
encouraged the development of similar institutions but with far less satisfactory results?  These questions
are examined after a description of the development of thrift deposit institutions in different countries.
;. Note:  The data in the table are based on published statistics in different countries.  If the institutions
were very small, statistics were not collected or published.  Such was probably the tone of credit unions
in the United Kingdom and building societies in France.
4Ordinary  Savings Banks
Ordinary savings banks, so named to distinguish them from postal savings banks, came in two forms: banks
that were required to invest all of their funds in government debt and banks that enjoyed greater freedom in
their investmeent  policies through expanded lending powers.  The first category included savings banks in
the United Kingdom and France, and the second savings banks in the United States (at least in some states),
Germany, Switzerland, anld  other European countries.
Savings banks were largely created in response to the orientation of commercial banks toward
industrv and commerce and the wealthier seaments of society.  They encouraged thrift by providing safe
and convenient outlets for the savings of wage earners and other low-income  groups.  But the motivation for
creating savings banks was not purely altruistic. There was also concern about the impact of relief given to
poor on government and municipal funds.  It was felt that if the poor could be encouraged to save, they
would put less of a burden on wealtilier segments of society. But, although they were established to provide
safe deposit facilities for the poor, and indeed initially put upper limits on the size of deposit accounts,
savings banks in most countries deviated from this orientation earlv on and sought deposits from wealthier
people.
Savings  banks met witil  considerable success  in most countries, largely because  of their  low
transaction costs.  Transaction costs were lower because of the simpler and more limited range of services
provided and the reliance on unpaid staff.  For example, in their early years savings banks were open only a
few hours on one or more days a week, did not encouraoe withdrawals, and did not operate through full
branchies. In Newv  England (and also in Australia) savings banks shared the same facilities as commercial
banks and represented little more than special windows that were open a few of days a week.  Over time,
savings banks became more business-like, were run by professional  staff and managers, and developed their
5bwn branch networks.  Although their relative efficiency in terms of transaction costs declined, savings
banks were favored by a preferential fiscal regime, both with regard to the deposit facilities offered to their
customers and with regard to the taxes they had to pay on their operations and profits.
Savings  Banks in Germany
The first German savings bank was founded in 1768 in Brunsw"ick  followed by the establishment of one in
Hamburg in 1778 (Cahill 1913:75). From there they spread quickly to several other German cities as well
as  to  Swiss  cities such  as  Bern and  Zurich.  Most German savings  banks  were  public  institutions.
established by  municipal  and  other local authorities and  operated under their  tutelage and  guarantee,
although their charters were approved by their respective state authorities.  However, a few savings banks
were established by private associations.
Savings banks were founded to prevent the poorer classes from falling into absolute poverty by
providing a place for the safe deposit of small sums of money. The first such banks were established in
connection witli efforts to reform the poor laws.  Because they catered to the needs of low-income groups.
most savings banks initially placed upper limits on deposit balances.  In addition, they provided no credit
facilities for depositors, as this service would have contradicted their stated purpose.  Moreover, savings
banks were required to invest in safe securities, and lending to poor wvorkers  was not considered safe.
About 280 savings banks had been established in Germany by  1836, and their number grew to
1,200 by 1850.  The number of deposits held in savings banks increased steeply with the acceleration of
industrialization after 1860.  By 1913 the deposits in the 3,133 German savings banks amounted to nearly
20 billion marks.  The eight big joint-stock banks held only 5 billion marks (Born 1983:107).  In order to
facilitate deposits and withdrawals, the savings banks established large branch networks and collecting
6agencies.  These totaled well over  7,500 uniits in  1910. which, including head  offices, creatcd a  total
network of more than 10,000 outlets (Cahill 1913:77).
The creation of savings banks in Germany was motivated not only by the desire to provide savinits
outlets for low-income groups, but also by the pragmatic considerationl  that miuinicipal  fuinds  for poor relief
would be less strained if the poor accumulated savings.  But the establishmiienlt  of hiealth  insuranlce  in 18S3
and old-age and disability insurance in 1889 eroded part of tie  original rationale for creating savings baniks.
and they increasingly became the banks for middle-class dep6sitors.  Unlike their counterparts in Britain
and France, German savings banks'were  not required to deposit their funlds  witli the state treasur)  or to
invest in govemment bonds, and they began to give credit to small-scale  manufacturers and artisans even in
the early phase of their development.  In 1911 about 60 percent of their deposits wvere  invested in mortgage
loans, secured oni  urban (40 percent) and rural property (20 percent). Slightly less than 25 percent of finds
were invested in securities, and a very small proportion were invested in personal loans (Cahill 1913:75).
The maximum amount of deposits was set by each banlk  and their guaranteeinig  autliority. As baniks
increased these limits over time in order to attract deposits from wealthier people, tiev  introduced notice
requirements-two-week,  four-week, tliree-month, and six-month -4hat  put limits on  the amounts that
could be withdrawn. These limits were not always upheld, but they provided a useful weapon  of defense in
times of monetary pressure.  Given that they  w'ere  funded from short-term deposits, savings banks were
granting short- to medium-term mortgages that were effectively interest-oinly'  loans with a recall option.
They were also able to vary the rate of interest on the loans in response to changes in market rates.
At the tum of the century the banks wvere  under pressure to develop mortgages with aninual  sinking-
fund payments.  These were different from modem, annuity-type mortgages, in which capital is reduced on
a  monthly  basis.  Instead,  sinking-fund mortgages accumulated a  fund  in an  interest-bearing deposit
account.  But sinking funds created problems with respect to their rate of interest and their availability to
7borrowers. In some cases sinking funds earned interest at the same rate as mortgage loans, in others at the
rate of savings deposits, and in still others at an intermediate rate.  Sinking funds wvere  not supposed to be
available to borrowers and were often used to reduce the loan balance once a  certain round sum was
accumulated.  But if borrowvers  %vere  allowed to use the sinking funds for other  purposes, any  interest
credited to them wvas  adjusted to the rate paid on ordinary savings deposits.
Savings banks made mortgage loans for up to 50 percent of the value of urban properties and 66
percent of the value of rural land.  Valuations were either based oln appraisals prepared by  specialized
mortgage credit banks and insurance companies or, in the case of farm land, on approved multiples of the
net yield declared for tax purposes.  There were no laws or regulations restricting mortgage loans witilin
their respective districts.  But the multiples allowed were generally greater for properties located in the
same district as the bank than for properties in other districts.  Also, the loan-to-value ratios were higiler for
properties in the same district than for those in other districts.  In order to encourage the creation of small
holdings, savings banks were prepared to use higher loan-to-value ratios (up to 75 percent or even  85
percent) for small holdings and allotments in their own district, provided that at least half of one percent of
the principal amount of the loan was repaid annually.
An  important feature of German savings banks was their three-tier structure.  Savings  banks
operated in local areas delineated by their guaranteeing authority but were supported regional central giro
institutions, which were in turn linked to a national giro institution. The three-tier structure emerged after
1908, when the savings banks were given the right to negotiate checks and proceeded to establish local giro
associations for cashless payment transactions. A giro association was formed in every Prussian province
and federal state by the municipal authorities.  These associations founded central giro  institutions as
clearing centers for their affiliated banks.  The central giro institutions also managed the liquidity reserves
of individual banks and provided a mechanism for transferring funds from savings banks with  surplus
8resources  to those with excess  demand  for funds. The  first central  giro institution  was created  in Saxony  in
1909. In 1918  a national  giro institution  was founded  as the center  point  for all giro institutions. Thus,  the
savings  banks were united  through  this large  nationwide  giro network  and also gained  access  to money  and
capital  markets.  ,;
Despite  their  public  ownership,  German  savings  banks  operated  very effectively.  They  were hit by
the hyperinflation  of the 1920s,  but were able to survive because  of their local authority guarantees.
Following  the currency reform, their savings deposits, mortgage loans, and mortgage bonds were all
'.  £
reduced  to 25 percent  of their book value,  and the savings  banks  were able to resume  their expansion. In
1930, 70 percent of their assets were long-term  loans in the form of mortgages  and public sector debt,
including  loans made  to local authorities.  But they also maintained  substantial  liquid funds  with their giro
institutions  and provided  short-term  credits. In conjunction  with the central  giro institutions,  the savings
banks became universal  banks that competed  with commercial  banks, particularly  for the business of
medium-size  enterprises  and middle-inicome  households.
Savings  banks  have  always  funded  their long-terrn  loans  and bonds  with short-term  deposits. This
practice  has exposed  them  to interest  rate risk, a problem  from which  they continue  to suffer. But because
of their state guarantees  and their strong  liquidity  positions,  they have  beeni  able to survive,  albeit  suffering
from periods of poor profitability. Today,  German  savings banks are under pressure because  they are
publicly  owned and because  they need external  capital to finance expansion. There are calls for their
privatization  and eventual  absorption  into  the commercial  banking  sector,  but it is not clear if and when  any
privatization  will  take  place.
Savings Banks in Britain
9Unlike in Germany and  other European countries where savings banks were founded with the explicit
support of local authorities, the initiatives to form savings banks in Britain came from private individuals,
mainly clergymen and  wealthy philanthropists.  The first British savings bank was established by the
Reverend Henry Duncan in  Ruthwell, Scotland in  1810.  Reverend Duncan played a  central  role in
advocating savings banks for lower-income groups.  But the Ruthwell Savings Bank was predated by an
earlier initiative in London.  In 1804 the Tottenham Benefit Bank wvas  established to enable poor people in
Tottenham to safely deposit their savings in an institution  that was guaranteed by "a few respectable  persons
of property." According to Born (1983), this institution paid 5 percent interest per year, but in its first years
did not invest its funds, and the interest was paid out of the pockets of the "respectable persons" wlho
managed its business (Born 1983:108).
The number of savings banks in the United Kingdom grew to twenty-six by 1815, seventy-eight by
1816, and 465 by the end of 1818 (Olmstead 1976:6).  They were established as private institutions, but
were bound by law to deposit their funds with the department of national savings, which invested these
funds in government bonds. The rate of interest paid to savings banks was often higher than the coupon rate
on govemment bonds, although bond holdings suffered losses when interest rates rose. During the Crimean
War the value of bonds held on behalf of the savings banks had a shortfall of 4 million British pounds
against total savings deposits of 9 million pounds. But the savings banks were insulated from these losses.
Bv  1861 their number had increased to 638, although following the creation of the Post Office Savings
Bank in that year, many savings banks closed down. Their number fell to 483 by 1873 (Born 1983:109).
Attempts to expand the lending and investment powers of savings banks were frustrated--not  least
because of opposition from the established commercial banks-until  the mid-1970s, when the  trustee
savings banks were reorganized and their powers expanded.  They were subsequently merged into one
group that culminated in the 1987 flotation of the TSB Group as a  full-fledged, stock-owned universal
10financial institution.  Despite the restrictions on the utilization of their deposit funds, the trustee savings
banks were able to expand  in number and along branch networks and to diversify into many ancillary,
services, including both mutual fund management and insurance services.
Savi.ngs  Banks in France
The  first French savings bank was the Caisse d'Epargne de Paris, which was founded in  1818 by the
directors and shareholders of an insurance company.  More than 350 savings banks were established bv
1845, mainly by private groups or nmunicipal  authorities. French savings banks were required to place their
deposits with the Caisse des Depots et Consignations,  a state institution  founded in 1816 and accountable to
the French Parliament.
When an individual's deposit reached 50 francs, it had to be converted into a perpetual state annuity
in the holder's name.  Thus savings banks funds were used to finance the public debt, partly in the form of
floating debt and partly in form of perpetual annuities.  But perpetual annuities created liquidity problems
and losses for the banks if they had to be sold in times of crisis and at low values.
Despite these recurring problems, the savings banks appealed not only to low-income groups but
also to wealthier segments of the population. To maintain the low-income orientation of savings banks, the
government imposed upper  limits on deposit accounts.  Over time, the French savings banks, like their
counterparts in the United Kingdom, developed extensive branch networks and diversified into ancillary
services. Benefiting from low transaction costs, fiscal incentives, and the controls on interest rates on retail
deposits, they continued to account for a large share of household deposits, although in the last decade they
have suffered from the emergence of money market mutual funds and the growing popularity of mutual
funds and life insurance policies.
IISavings Banks in the United States
Savings banks in the United States appeared a few years after those in the United Kiigdom and at more or
less the same time as those in France.  The first institutions to begin operating were the Philadelphia Saving
Fund Society and the Provident Institution for Savings in Boston, both of whichi  opened in  1816.  The
Savings Bank of Baltimore was organized in 1818 and the Bank for Savings in the City of New York in
1819  (Payne and Davis 1956:12-18).
These institutions were strongly influenced by the success and rapid expansion of savings banks in
the United Kingdom.  They were established by men who were active entrepreneurs not only in insurance
and commercial banking but also in industry and commerce.  Yet  despite their backing by  prominent
personalities in the business world, the first application to obtain a charter for a savings bank in New York
was rejected "in consequence of the principles not being distinctly comprehended and the preponderant
objection against the incorporation of any more banks" (Krooss and Blyn  1971:61).  The petition was
rejected because it aroused the opposition of the antibank group, and for this reason the supporters of
savings institutions in Philadelphia and Boston avoided using the word bank in their title.
The number of savings banks increased quickly as this  institutional innovation spread to other
eastem and mid-Atlantic states.  By  1820 there were ten savings banks with more than  $1 million  in
deposits.  Thneir  number rose to fifteen by 1825 and to fifty-two by 1835, with more than $10 million in
deposits.  But their business was very unevenly distributed. More than half of the deposits were made witlh
New York savings banks, while about three-quarters  of New York savings deposits were held with the Bank
for Savings.
As in other countries the U.S. savings banks were at first founded to "ameliorate the condition of
the poorer classes" (Bank for Savings) or to  "aid and assist the poor and middling classes of society in
putting their money out to advantage" (Philadelphia Saving Fund Society).  In line witlh  their primary
12objective to provide deposit facilities for the poor, some savings banks restricted the size of deposits and
some paid declining graduated interest rates (a lower rate for balances above a certain limit). Savingrs  bank-s
in New York and most other states were subject to investment constraints that forced them to invest in
federal government debt or in local state anid  city bonds.  The Bank for Savingcs  in New York played a
crucial part in financing the construction of the Erie Canal.  In 1821 it hield  30 percent of its stock, which
wvas  tantamount to a public bond (Olmstead 1972:824).  Banks in Massachusetts and Maryland were not
required to invest in public sector bonds, althougrh  thiey  wvere  prohibited from inivesting,  in bonds of other
states or from lendingy  to corporations or people residingr  in othier  states.  But even these banks iniitially
placed their deposits in safe investments, mostly local state and city bonds.  Savings banks also deposited
their funds wvithi  commercial banks.
Gradually. but very early in their history, the restrictionis  on deposits anid inlvestments  of savings
baniks were dismantled.  Thius,  Pennsylvania repealed the restrictionl  oni  the size of deposits in  1824, and
Newv  York permitted mortgage loanis  ini  1830W.  Savingas  banks began to reorient thiem-selves  toward wealthiier
groups, especially those baniks  that wvere  more concemed with safety than growvth. Thiey  expanded their
business houirs anid begran  to m-ove out of public sector bonds and inito loans secured by  mortgrages  or
securities anid  even inito  loanis based oni  personal secuirity. By  1  825 the Baltimore Savings Bank had put
thiree-quarters  of its assets in sec`ur-ty  and personal security loanis. These loans were concentrated among a
smiall  group of merchlants. In Massachiusetts  loans oni  personial  security,  accounted for about onie-quarter  of
assets in 1835 (Krooss and Blvni  1971: 62).
Thie Massachiusetts  Hospital Life fInsurance  Company was created in  1823)  as a  life  insurance
company but operated  more like a  savings bank or  a trust.  It  wvas  founided by  prominent Bostonian
finlanlciers  anid  inidustrialists  to provide inicomie  for the Massachiusetts  Genieral  Hospital anid  to offer savings
banik services for thie  richi  anld  mniddle  classes.  Contrary to early savingas  bank practice, this institution did
13 not take deposits of less than $500 for less than five years, and it discouraged the business of those who
could take care of their own affairs.  The Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance conducted very little life
insurance business, but became knowvn  as the  "Great Savings Bank."  It  became the  largest financial
institution of its day and was the most important source of medium-term finance for New England industry,
especially the textile industry (Davis  1960:8).  The first president of the  Massachusetts Hospital Life
Insurance was William Phillips, who  %vas  also president of the Massachusetts Bank and  the Provident
Institution for Savings.  Ebenezer Francis, who was the driving-force behind its creation, was a director of
the Boston Bank and later the first president of the Suffolk Bank (Krooss and Blyn 1971:58-9).
Savings banks were the fastest growing financial institutions in the United States by the middle of
the nineteenthi  century.  Their deposits grew from $10 million in 1835 to $150 million in 1860.  Although
they continued to attract deposits from low-income  groups, their customers also included wealthy people.
In addition to federal, state, and city bonds, savings banks were investing in corporate securities and making
business and mortgage loans.  In the mid-I 850s well over 50 percent of New York savings bank assets were
in government securities and more than 40 percent were in mortgages.  In Massachusetts loans on personal
security and mortgages accounted for 60 percent of assets.  But the savings banks suffered from liquidity
problems during the crisis of 1857, and they  vere forced to build up their liquid assets, shifting their focus
to government bonds.
Nevertheless, savings banks continued to expand until the crisis of 1873. After 1873 many savings
banks suspended their operations, and although total losses were small, there was a sharp swing toward
conservatism.  In New Yorkl regulations were imposed, limiting investments to government bonds and
mortgage loans for less than 50 percent of appraised value.  In other states savings banks faced increasing
competition from commercial banks, wvhich  started to attract depositors with interest-bearing time deposits,
and from building and loan associations.
14The relative importance of mutual savings banks declined after 1S90,  mainly because they failed to
take root in the fast-growing West.  Between 1860 and 1890 their assets grew from $150 million to $1.7
billion.  But after 1890 their growth decelerated sharply, and by 1922 their assets amounted to only $6.6
billion. In comparison, savings and loan associations held $2.8 billion and commercial banks $47 billion.
During this  period savings banks operated in sixteen states but only played an important role in New
England and the mid-Atlantic states.
Unlike the public savings banks in Germany and other Central European countries, which were
promoted by forwvard-looking  public officials, and the savings banks in the United Kingdom and France,
which were fostered by clergymen and wealtlhy  philanthropists, savings banks in the United States were
mostly championed  by  men  of  industry and  finance.  As  a  result  there  were  extensive interlocking
directorships among the management of savings banks and that of commercial banks, insurance companies,
and industrial and commercial enterprises.  Over time, these interlocking positions gave rise to close links
between savings  banks and the  financial and  industrial establishment.  And as  a result savings  banks
provided considerable funds for financing industrial  and commercial firms.
The most telling examples were the savings banks in New England, whiicil  were the most important
suppliers of long-term finance to the textile industry; Savings banks provided 40 percent of all new long-
term loans during 1840-60 to the eight leading textile mills.  Trust companies provided 29 percent of the
total, commercial banks only 4 percent, and individuals contributed 22 percent (Davis 1960:6).  Moreover,
the savings banks charged lower interest rates on these long-terrn loans than the rates prevailing in the
shorter-term markets, and they always observed the usury ceilings on interest rates.  Savings banks also held
corporate stock, and they were major stockholders of New England commercial banks.  The close links
between commercial and savings banks were evident from the sharing of branch facilities: savings banks
15were little more than special windows of commercial banks that were open a few days a week.  Savings
bank depositors benefited from this arrangement because of lower transaction costs.
Davis (1960) noted that banks in the Ulnited  Kingdom or in the western United States tended to
withdraw from affected markets when faced with binding usury ceilings, forcing firms to  borrow from
unregulated sources.  Usury ceilings thus had the unintended effect of raising the effective cost of funds for
industrial and commercial firms.  Davis also noted that in the face of binding usury ceilings, nonprice
rationing must have played an important role in finance: As a result firms that had good connections with
j
savings banks through interlocking directorships obtained finance on more favorable terms than firms with
no such connections.  In particular, new industries "may wvell  have found loan finance almost impossible to
obtain through traditional channels in times of credit stringency" (Davis 1960:4).
One explanation for the behavior of savings banks is that they wvere  provincial in their lending
policies, preferring to keep their investments wliere they  could be closely watched rather thani seeking
higher returns in out-of-state operations (Payne and  Davis 1956:110-13).  This pattem was seen amonig
savings  banks in all  states and  also reflected the pattern observed in Germany.  The provincialism in
investment policy and the geographic concentration of assets was one manifestation of the immobility of
long-term capital in the  United States until the last part of the nineteenthi century  (Davis and  Payne
1958:404).  This immobility could be attributed to the information problems that affected lendinig  to or
investing in companies located in othier  states.
But another explanation holds that the directors whio  managed the affairs of savings banks did not
attempt to maximize the returns on their investments, but were quite happy to lend these funds to their own
textile  companies at  below  market rates  (Vatter 1961:216-21; Olmstead  1974:816).  This  explanation
challenaes the purely altruistic motivation of the founding men, who claimed to want to  establish and
manage savings banks for the sole benefit of the poorer classes (Payne and Davis 1956:20-21). Instead it
16suggests that these institutions became as useful to the founders and managers as to the people for which
they  wvere  ostensibly established.  Olmstead (1974:816) raised the question of whether their objectives
changed over time as they grew in importance. Their reorientation toward wealthier depositors lends some
support to this view.
Even the Savings Bank of New York, which was not allowed to invest in nongovemment securities,
was affected by the close links between the promoters and directors of the Savings Bank and the promoters
of the projects that the Bank financed (Olmstead 1976). Several of the directors helped to plan projects that
.4; 
the Bank financed, while in other cases they actively prodded government planners to proceed with social
overhead investments by assuring officials that finance from the bank would be forthcoming (Olmstead
1972:810). The directors stood to gain large nonpecuniary (and possibly indirect pecuniary) benefits from
the success of the projects they so actively sponsored. Nevertheless, Olmstead (1974:834) concluded that
the trustees of the New York Savings Bank were attempting to maximize the real rate of return on their
portfolios, given legal constraints.  Thleir  primary objective was to pursue their depositors' interests, despite
the many conflict-of-interest situations that arose.  Olmstead also noted that state governments reaped
substantial benefits from the investment constraints imposed on mutual savings banks in the form of lower
interest payments on their entire  debt.  Moreover, the early constraints were instrumental not only  in
chianneling  savings bank assets into the financing of the Erie Canal, but also in indirectly helping to attract
funds from other investors wvho  entered the market only after the canal was partially opened, and was not
nearly so risky a venture.  The initial success of New York State in financing,  its public works encouraged
other states to embark on similar projects (Olrnstead 1972:838).
Postal Savings Banks
17Although  savings  banks  were initially  established  to provide  safe deposit  facilities  for low-  income  groups,
their reorientation  toward high- and middle-income  groups  early in their development  and their lack of
extensive  branch  networking  prevented  them from filling  the gap in savings  facilities. To meet this need
postal  savings  banks  were established,  the first in the United  Kingdom  in 1861. It was  followed  by Japan in
1875,  France  in 1881,  Austria  in 1883,  and the United  States  in 1910  (Born 1983:337).
Postal  savings  banks  were created  in order to encourage  saving  by low-income  groups. Although
they paid  a modest  interest  rate (in Britain  the rate was lower  than that paid by the trustee  savings  banks),
their main attractions  were safety,  since  they  had the explicit  backing  of the state,  and convenience,  as they
operated  through  nationwide  networks  of post offices. The services  offered  by postal savings  banks  were
often  complemented  by postal  giros,  whicli  offered  money  transfer  services  through  the post offices. Postal
giros took the lead in many European  countries  in the late 1950s  in automating  payment services  and
offering  more  efficient  clearing  services.
Unlike  postal giros, whichl  are mostly found in Central  and Northern  European  countries,  postal
savings  banks  were created  in almost  all countries. Their record  in mobilizing  resources  has varied from
modest  to impressive,  and their relative  success  can be attributed  to a number  of factors. For  example,  thev
have done better in countries  where commercial  banks  and other competing  institutions  had small branch
netvorks (such as in Japan),  or in countries  where  they have  enjoyed  fiscal  advantages  that were denied  to
their competitors  (such as in France). In Japan commercial  bank networks  have been subject to strict
official  regulation,  in France  only deposits  with the postal  and ordinary  savings  banks  have benefited  from
fiscal incentives. The relative importance  of postal savings banks has been greatest in the former
communist  countries,  wvhere  they  had the monopoly  on collecting  household  deposits. Despite  establishing
the first postal  savings  bank,  postal  savings  in the United  Kingdom  did not grow  very large relative  to the
18domestic  financial  system,  mainly  because  commercial  banks,  building  societies,  and trustee  savings  banks
were able  to develop  large  branch  networks  and to offer  more  attractive  deposit  facilities.
The most successful  postal savings bank has been the Japanese bank, which, on the basis of
resources  mobilized,  is by far the largest  financial  institution  in the world.  Its total deposits amount to
nearly 1.5 trillion  dollars  at current  rates of exchange-more than three times bigger  than the assets  of the
largest  banks. The success  of the postal savings  bank in Japan is often  attributed  to the fiscal advantages
conferred  on deposits of up to 3 million yen.  But this explanation  is not correct because the fiscal
incentives  applied for all small deposits,  not  just those made  with the postal  savings  bank. The success  of
the  postal  savings  bank  came  mainly  from  the convenience  of its vast branch  network  (only  in the 1980s  did
the branch  networks  of all other deposit  institutions  match  that of the post office) and, to a lesser extent,
from the safety of explicit  govemment  backing. Safety  was more important  in the past, wheni  bank runs
afflicted  the Japanese  financial  system. But it was clearly  less important  in the past fifty years as official
Japanese  policy  sought  to prevent  the failure  of any bank. The importance  of the safety factor  was shown
during the banking  crisis  of April 1927,  when thirty-seven  banks  were unable  to meet demands  for deposit
withdrawals.  As a result,  deposits  at the five biggest  banks  increased  by about 30 percent  within  a year  of
the crisis and by about  28 percent  at ordinary  savings  banks,  which were  not affected  by the crisis. But the
deposits  of the postal  savings  banks  almost  doubled  in the same  period  (Born 1983:253).
Until  recently,  postal  savings  banks  were required  to place their deposit  funds  in government  debt.
This requirement  converted  such deposits  into a captive  source  for financing  government  budgets,  and in
many countries  the returns  offered  to depositors  were highly  negative  in real terms. But in recent years
19there has been a trend to expand the lending powers of postal savings banks and in some cases to merge
them with existing commercial banks or to convert them into full-fledged commercial banks. 4
As long as postal savings deposits were channeled to government agencies, their contribution was
limited to  the mobilization of resources.  Their contribution to  investment and  economic development
depended on  the efficiency  and  effectiveness of their and  other government agency operations.  It  is
sometimes argued that the success (or alleged success) of policy-based finance in Japan wvas  attributable to
the reliance on postal savings for financing policy-based lending operations. To the extent that using postal
savings  was  less  inflationary than  using  commercial  bank  deposits or  central  bank  credit  for  such
operations, this argument would be valid.  But many other countries have used postal savings for policy-
based operations, and their results were far inferior to those of Japan.  The relative success of Japanese
credit policies should be attributed to their more efficient management of credit programs and, in particular,
to the greater effectiveness of monitoring final borrowers' use of funds. But it cannot be denied that, as long
as safety, convenience, and low transaction costs are important factors, postal savings banks can make an
important contribution  in encouraging thrift, especially among lower-income groups, and in mobilizing
financial resources.
Credit  Cooperatives
Credit cooperatives, in particular the Raiffeisen banks, were hailed as the most wonderful institutions in the
world by  a  report of a  U.S. Commission that  studied European agriculture  in the  first decade of the
'.  For example, in Sweden the post office savings bank was merged with a previously state-owned
commercial bank to form the PK Bank in 1974. More recently, the PK Bank was merged into the
Nordbanken.  In the Netherlands the postal savings bank was first merged with the postal giro to form the
Postal Bank in the late 1970s. The new bank was later taken over by another commercial bank, which
itself was subsequently taken over by the ING group, a financial conglomerate witlh  interests in both
banking and insurance.
20twentieth century (Metcalf and Black 1915). Similarly, positive views were also expressed in a U.K. report
on  German agriculture (Cahill  1913).  This favorable assessment was not affected by the disputes and
divisions that  afflicted the  movement in Germany.  It  reflected the  success of  credit cooperatives  in
mobilizing resources and offering credit services to German farmers, artisans, and small traders and the
avoidance  of  failures.  As  in  the  case  of  savings  banks, these  institutional  inniovationis  generated
considerable interest in other countries and they quickly spread to several neighboring countries.
Credit cooperatives were created to meet the credit ne;'ds of small farmers in rural areas and those
of  artisans  and  small  traders  in  6rban  areas,  tlhus protecting them  from the  high  rates  charged  by
moneylenders.  Like savings banks, credit cooperatives benefited from low transaction costs, as they often
operated out of the kitchen of a farmer and relied on unpaid managers and staff.  In addition, because of
their reliance on local knowledge and peer monitoring,  their loan losses were unusually low.
Credit cooperatives used the joint and several unlimited liability of members to raise funds from
nonmembers and to makae  loans on the security of the character, moral worth, industry, sobrietv, and thrift
of their members, reinforced by peer pressure and mutual oversight. Thrift was motivated by the principle
of unlimited liability and contributed to a high loan repayment record.  Effective peer monitoring was
facilitated by the small size and small area of operation of most credit cooperatives.
Credit  cooperatives were championed by  men  of high  integrity and  social  standing, such  as
clergymen,  wealthy  philanthropists, or  public  officials.  The  protagonists  emphasized  self-help  and
developed a three-tier structure.  Regional units facilitated the flow of funds across individual cooperatives
and also provided valuable audit and control services, while national units represented the joint interests of
credit cooperatives and provided a link to national money and capital markets.  Urban credit cooperatives,
whose area of operations were  large, abandoned the concept of unlimited liability very early  in their
21development.  But all types of credit cooperatives  emphasized  the need to accumulate  reserve  funds  to be
used  during  times of difficulty.
Despite the clear advantages  enjoyed  by credit cooperatives  in terms of lower transaction  and
information  costs and lower loan losses, Guinnane  (1993:1)-noted  that their critics in Germany and
elsewhere  argued  that their success  was not attributable  to their higher  efficiency  but rather  to their reliance
on local  boosterism  in the form of unpaid  managerial  labor. In addition,  critics  accused  credit cooperatives
of being  patronage  devices  through  which  local  elites controlled  poor  people's  access  to credit and, with it,
their customers,  laborers,  and so on.  But the great success  of these institutions  in the ensuing 100 years
strongly suggests that these criticisms  overly exaggerated  any underlying  tendencies  of patronage and
control.
Credit Cooperatives in Gernmany
Credit  cooperatives  were first  established  in Germany  in the 1  840s. The first  cooperatives  were urban  credit
cooperatives  founded  by Hernann Schulze-Delitzsch,  which catered to the needs of artisans and small
traders. The first rural credit cooperatives  were established  in the 1860s  by Friedrich  Wilhelm  Raiffeisen
and Wilhelm Haas.  These institutions  were oriented toward farmers and other people living in small
villages. Both types  of cooperatives  initially  had unlimited  liability. After the passing  of the law on credit
cooperatives  in 1889,  most urban cooperatives  gradually  adopted  limited liability,  but rural cooperatives
continued  to rely on unlimited  liability.  Both  types  of credit  cooperatives  experienced  rapid  growth.
By the mid-  I 860s  eighty  urban  credit  cooperatives  were  operating  with nearly  20,000  members. A
general association  of trading and economic  cooperatives  was created in 1864 to represent their joint
interests,  while a central  cooperative  bank was also established  in the same year in Berlin  as a partnership
limited  by shares. Although  the purpose  of the central  cooperative  bank was to act as a clearinghouse  for
22credit  cooperatives-ccepting  their  deposits  and  granting  them  credits  on  current  accounts-credit
cooperatives  made  little  use  of  its  services, and  the  central  cooperative bank  engaged  in  ordinary
commercial and investment banking.  But it suffered substantial losses in this business and it was merged
witih  the expanding Dresdner Bank in 1904.  Despite the problems of their central cooperative bank. urban
credit cooperatives continued to expand.  Their number rose to 740 witih  more than 300,000 members by
1870 and to 1,500 with more than 800,000 members by 1913.  More than 1.5 billion marks in credit waas
provided in 1913 (Born 1983:111-12).
;,
The number of  rural credit cooperatives also  increased very rapidly.  There were thirtv  such
cooperatives by 1866 and about 100 by 1872, when Raiffeisen created the first central cooperative bank for
rural  credit cooperatives at  Neuwied.  Two more central banks  were founded by  Raiffeisen in quick
succession and all three were united to form the German Agricultural General Bank in 1874, whiichi  was a
registered society with unlimited liability.  But Schulze-Delitzsch objected to the creation of a central bank
without share capital and took the matter to the courts.  As a result, the central bank for rural cooperatives
w"as  dissolved and reconstituted in 1876 as a joint-stock company called the German Agricultural Central
Loan Bank (also referred to as the Central Raiffeisen Bank).: It was owned by societies that participated in
the Federation of Raiffeisen banks.
The rural credit cooperatives were further divided in 1877 between those founded by Raiffeisen,
who favored the creation of a three-tier structure with considerable central control in order to level out the
differences  between  poor  and  rich  cooperatives,  and  those  founded  by  Haas,  who  defended  the
independence and autonomy of individual cooperatives and wanted to limit the role of central bodies to the
representation of common interests, counseling, and cash audits.  Despite this division, the number of rural
credit cooperatives continued to expand, reaching more than  1,700 by  1890 and nearly 17,000 by  1913,
when they had a total membership of 1.5 million (Cahill 1913:98). Their total assets amounted to 3 billion
23marks, representing about 5 percent of the total assets of German banks (Guinnane 1994b:43).  By  1913
fiftv-twvo  regional central banks were operating in addition to two national ones: the Central Raiffeisen Bank
and the Prussian Central Cooperative Banlk,  a state bank that wvas  established in 1895. The total assets of all
credit cooperatives accounted for 8 percent of all banking assets in 1913.
The creation of  central banks  intensified the "system dispute" between Schtulze-Delitzsch and
Raiffeisen.  Opposition to a central bank with unlimited liability was based on the argument that individual
societies should not assume double unlimited liability-their  owvn  and that of other societies.  But another
source of system dispute had to do wvith  the use of share capital and entrance fees.  Although both Schulze-
Delitzsch and Raiffeisen favored unlimited liability and the accumulation of reserves to strengthen the
solvency of credit cooperatives over time, urban cooperatives introduced share capital, whichi,  together with
accumulated reserves, would provide a first buffer, while the joint unlimited liability of members would
provide a second liie  of defense.  Raiffeisen was opposed to levying entrance fees and the institution of
share capital, as they would have prevented poorer farmers from joining.
In the early days of credit cooperatives three types of liability structure were discussed: unlimited
liabilitv, unlimited contributory liability, and limited liability.  Unlimited liability implied that members
were individually ard  collectively .csponsible for the debts of the cooperative.  In case of insolvency the
cooperatives would first apply a per capital levy on all members.  But if the cooperative still had unsettled
debts after three months, creditors could sue individual members for the full amount of the debt.  Although
members had a right of restitution from the cooperative, if other members wvere  much poorer, the likelihood
of recovery would be very small.  For this reason joint and several unlimited liability made more sense in
communities where all members were small farmers and had more or less equal financial means.
The concept of unlimited contributory liability was introduced by the law of  1889.  Under this
arrangement per  capita levies could be imposed on members, but creditors could not start proceedings
24against  individual members.  Contributions not  recovered from  individual members, owing  to  their
insolvency, could be divided equally among remaining members. Thus members' liability continued to be
unlimited, but  the  process  of  debt  recovery would be  subject to  a  long  and  tedious  procedure  that
undermined the ability of cooperatives to raise debt from nonmembers. Tlis  form of liability was adopted
by only a small number of cooperatives.
Limited liability involved both the purchase of a share in the cooperative and the agreement to pay
an additional predetermined fixed sum of money in case of insolvency (this was similar to the concept of
double liability that prevailed in commercial banks in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth
centurv).  In Saxony and Pomerania, wlhere  most rural credit cooperatives witil limited liability were found,
the additional liability was between forty and fifty times the nominal value of each share.  In these two
provinces landowning members had suffered from the collapse of some urban credit  cooperatives with
unlimited liabilitv.  When limited liability was legalized by the act of 1889, it was adopted by rural credit
cooperatives to counter the niistrust of landowners  (Cahill 1  913:1  14-20).
Because of their different  orientation, urban and  rural credit  cooperatives developed different
operating characteristics.  The urban cooperatives focused on short-term lendinig,  operated in bigger areas,
and had larger membership. After the adoption of limited liability, wvhich  was probably made necessary by
the wide area of operations and large membership and therefore the inability of members to monitor each
other, some urban credit cooperatives were faced with solvency problems from bad loans.  In contrast, most
rural credit cooperatives had a small membership and operated in a narrow and well-defined area.  This set
up facilitated peer monitoring and supported the maintenance  of unlimited liability.  From the outset, rural
cooperatives were able to make loans for five to ten years, repayable in installments. The security was the
character of the borrower, the purpose of the loan, and two other memilbers  as sureties.  Between 1  895 and
1910 only nineteen rural credit cooperatives out of  10,000 were involved in bankruptcy proceedings.
25During the same period there were sixty-nine cases of insolvency  among the more than 1,000 urban credit
cooperatives, and  a  total  of  386 bankruptcies among  6,000 ordinary commercial  banking  and  credit
undertakings (Cahill 1913:  118).
The concept of unlimited liability was supplemented by the creation of a three-tier structure to
ensure the good performance and stability of rural credit cooperatives (Guinnane 1994b).  The three-tier
structure enabled rural cooperatives to overcome their funding exposure, which arose because thev made
long-term loans from short-term deposits.  Credit cooperatives were also vulnerable to liquidity problems
that could be caused by a shock affecting all members in a local area.  The regional cooperatives provided
liquiditv management and funding as wvell  as auditing services that increased the general creditworthiness of
credit  cooperatives.  They  also  forced  discipline  on  individual  cooperatives  and  kept  fraud  and
mismanagement under control.
This impressive record inspired the authors of the report of the American Commission from the
State of \Washington  to describe the Raiffeisen system as the most wonderful system in the wvorld,  "capable
of creating capital otit of nothilng,"  and to assert that "moral character, industry, sobriety, and thirift were
better security than property!"  The enthusiasm with which the Raiffeisen banks wvere  greeted in Europe is
exemplified by several statements from the sponsors of credit cooperatives in Italv. The first statement was
made by Luigi Luzzatti, wvho  established the first urbani  credit cooperative in Nlilan in 1865:
The rural bank, which arose without capital, rich only in its invisible treasure  of mutual
trust and human solidarity, is the fruit of the modest, unrecognized virtues of the country
folk, bound together by bonds of mutual affection, who assist and watch over each other
with the subtle vigilance of neighbors.  And, lo and behold. these humble folk, void of
economic lore, have accomplished a miracle, due to the fact that a moral and not a material
26impulse guided their work, the miracle of creating capital out of nothing. (Metcalf and
Black 1915:114)
LIzzatti also declared:
The security of a cooperative bank is the moral character of its members.  To make these
banks  secure,  we  have  to  make  the  lazy  man  industrious, the  drunkard  sober,  the
improvident thrifty, and even the illiterate educated. (Metcalf and Black 1915:1  1  5)
The third statement was made by Leone Wollemborg, who founrded  the first Italian rural credit cooperative
in Loreggia in 1883:
Suppose you have 100 small working farmers, all possessing honesty, industry and  labor
capacity; this is their only capital. A capitalist might witlh  safety make them a loan of fifty
francs each; but some of these men will certainly be afflicted with sickness, death or lack
of employment.  It is impossible to say whiich  will thus be unable to pay, but it is certain
that it Nvill  only be a certain proportion. Experience has shown that 98 will pay.  In order to
meet the liability, the group must undertake to become responsible for tile other two who
are likely to be unable to pay.  There will be 98 men to repay the loan made to 100. They
will thus be able to assume responsibility for a loan of 49 each instead of 50, for they will
have  to  assume  responsibility for  the  two  unable to  pay  and  by  making  themselves
collectively responsible for the loan, they 'vill be able to make it for 49 multiplied by 100.
It is thus seen that the mathematical formula on which these banks are able to secure their
capital is nothing more than an application of the same principle wvhich  governs insurance.
Therefore unlimited liability is the first principle.  The other principle is limitation of the
area  of  operations, restricting it to  certain  localities, and  this  limitation  of  area also
constitutes the justification of the principle of unlimited liability.  It would not be fair to
27expect a man  to make himself responsible for a  loan, the use of Nvhich  wvas  beyond his
control.  But when the loans are strictly limited to people residing in the same locality, all
can become vigilant and act as inspectors for their own protection. And you wvill  find that
inspection thus exercised is far superior to any government inspection, since each man has
been rendered personally liable and is acting as inspector in hlis  own interest. As one of the
farmers said: 'We are 100, all acting as spies on the others to see that nobody does anythiing
wronJ.' (Metcalf and Black 1915:68)
Cr-edit  Cooperativ  es in Othter  E  uropean Countries
These obsernationis  were based on the German experience as Luzzatti was a student of Schulze-Delitzscil
and Wollernborg a student of Raiffeisen.  Despite extolling its virtues, Italian credit cooperatives did not
adopt unlimited liability because peasants were iglorant  of the workings of organized credit  and  meni
owniling  propertv wvere  unwilling to become liable for poor neighbors withiout  property. Nevertheless, credit
cooperatives made considerable progress in Italv.  The growth of rural cooperatives was stimulated by the
cooperation and support provided by savings banks and by urban credit cooperatives, known in Italy as
"people's bantks". Credit cooperatives spread in several other European countries, such as Austria, Belgium,
France. Hungar'  and othler Eastem European countries, and Svitzerland.  Credit cooperatives were also
well developed in Canada, although they eventually evolved into credit unions.
As in the case of savings banks, credit cooperatives were promoted in most countries by clergymen,
wealthy philanthiropists  or, as in the case of Schulze-Delitzscih  and Raiffeisen, local officials and politicians.
In general, the promoters emphiasized  self-lhelp  and opposed relying on govenmnent financial assistance,
except for publicity and education.  France wvas  the one exception-the  credit agricole Nvas  supported by a
2Ssubstantial loan from the Bank of France.  This condition was imposed by the government on the Bank of
France as a condition for renewing its charter in 1  897.
There was an  intriauing contrast in authorities' attitudes in Germanv and in France.  Wlhen the
cooperative movement was founded in Germany, the authorities were at first opposed to it.  The King of
Saxony forbade the first convention of cooperative societies called by  Schulze-Delitzsch at  Dresden in
1859.  Moreover, both William of Prussia and Bismarck wvere  hostile, seeing cooperation as an insidious
form of  socialism intending to  undermine govemment.  Bit,  later oni, in view of the success  of the
cooperatives and their contribution to the prosperity of the rural population, the attitude of the authorities
became very favorable and supportive (Metcalf and Black 1915:22).
In France the creation of credit cooperatives was promoted by  Louis Durand whlo  studied the
Raiffeisen system and  began to establish in  1893 what wvere  known as the "caisses Durand."  But the
republican government of the time perceived the caisses Durand to be a ploy of reactionaryv  forces that were
associated with the Catholic chiurch.  To  preempt their initiative, the  government enacted a  law that
promoted the creation of both local and regional agricultural banks that were effectively' established along
departmental liies and thus subject to political control (Bonin 1992:29-32). The regional banks played a
key  part in  rediscounting the  bills  of  local banks and  distributing central  bank credit  to  local banks
established in accordance witil the provisions of the republican law.  The availability of state credit and
perhaps also the fact that the credit cooperative system was developed from the top down generated a low
level of deposits, as farners  preferred to deposit their money with the savings banks (Metcalf and Black
1915:230-35).
After  World War  I  the  French authorities passed  legislation that  encouraged the  creation  of
"banques populaires" by merchants, craftsmen, and professionals in order to increase the supply of credit to
the middle class. A Caisse Centrale des Banques Populaires was founded in 1921 followed by the Chambre
29Syndicale des Banques Populaires, which intended to strengthen the control and supervision of individual
banks, whiich  had suffered many failures.  In addition, measures were taken to consolidate and expand the
operations of agricultural credit cooperatives, of whiicii  there were already more than 4,000 by World War 1.
The Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole was created in 1920, and it helped expand the number of rural
credit cooperatives to about 10,000, of which about two-thirds belonged to the favored public network and
the rest consisted of caisses libres (Bom 1983:240-241).5
Credit cooperatives did not meet with much success in the United Kingdom and Ireland.  Several
reasons were advanced for the failure of credit cooperatives in the United Kingdom. First, the large branch
net-works  established by joint-stock banks made credit facilities available to a larger number of farmers than
in other countries, implyingr  that fewer farmers relied oni loans from moneylenders at high rates.  Second,
farmers had access to trade credit from suppliers.  Third, unlimited liability was unpopular in the United
Kingdom, where limited liability by  share capital wvas  widespread.  Fourth, average farmers and small
holders were allegedly unwvilling  to  disclose their financial condition to their neiglhbors and  were also
allegedly reluctant to borrow  in cash (as distinct from trade  credit, given in kind) (Metcalf and  Black
1915:258). Another possible factor was the greater concentration of land owinershiip  and larger size of farms
in the United Kingdom, implying that there were fewer small landholders than in other countries.
In Ireland, although Irish bankers argued that credit cooperatives failed simply because there was
no need  for  them, other  obsenrers maintained that credit  was expensive for  small  holders andcredit
cooperatives could have been a solution to the problem.  The failure of credit cooperatives in Ireland has
been attributed to several factors (Guinnane 1994a). First, because most cooperatives were established vith
'The Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole played a central role in the distribution of subsidized credits to
French farmers after the end of World War II. Today, the French Credit Agricole, like the Dutch Rabobank,
are among the largest universal banks in Europe.
30unlimited liability, they didn't attract the more prosperous locals whose burden in case of insolvency would
have been unequal with respect to poorer members.  However, the absence of prosperous locals deprived
the credit cooperatives in Ireland of the monitoring and expertise that was a crucial factor for the success in
Germany.  Second, Irish cooperatives failed to develop the central banks that were a feature of the German
system.  Although credit facilities were obtained from the state and from joint-stock banks, the failure to
develop strong central auditing federations deprived Irish cooperatives of the discipline and good record
keeping found in Germany.
Third, Irish farmers were reluctant to force their neighbors to repay their loans or face adverse
consequences. Thus a major rationale for the creation of credit cooperatives, the discipline exerted by peer
monitoring, was absent in Ireland.  Fourth, Irish farmers were reluctant to borrow froim  credit cooperatives
and  thus disclose their financial position to the entire community.  In contrast, German farmers were
reportedly happier borrowing from their local credit cooperatives than from banks.  Irish farmers were even
reluctant to place deposits withi credit  cooperatives and thus expose theimiselves  to pressures to extend
personal loans or to act as cosigners for loans. Because the Post Office Savings Bank was established in the
United Kingdom and Ireland before credit cooperatives, the need to provide deposit and savings facilities in
rural areas that were not well served by commercial or savings banks-one  of the rationales for  their
emergence in Germany-was  not pressing.  Another important factor may have been the purchase of land
bv tenant farmers that was made possible through government mortgages.  Althoughi  mortgage payments
were probably lower than land rents, the assumption of large debt sharply reduced the ability of farmers to
borrow from other sources.
The  experience  of  Irish  credit  cooperatives  supports the  arguments  made  explaining  credit
cooperatives' lack of progress in the United Kingdom.  The failure of credit cooperatives in Ireland also
31underscores the importance of cultural and educational factors, tie  importance of sequencing institutional
innovations, and the difficulties of transplanting institutions  and practices from one country to another.
Building Societies and Savings and Loan Associations
In several continental European countries savings banks and credit cooperatives as wvell  as mortgage credit
banks were able to expand into mortgage banking and housing finanice; They thus filled the nap in the
provision of hiousing  finance to middle-income people that wvas  created by the orientation of commerciail
£  banks toward industrial and commercial companies and Nvealthv  individuals.  But in tile United KICindoin
and the United States (as well as several other Anglo-American  countries, such as Australia, NeNv  Zealanid.
South Africa, and to a lesser degree Canada), wvhere  savings banks and credit cooperatives were either not
successful or  not alloNved  to engage in  lending, building societies and  savincis and  loan associations
emerged to fill this gap.  These institutions specialized in the provision  of housing finanlce  but funded their
operations from short-term deposits rather than long-term bonds.
Building  societies  and  savings  and  loan  associations (initially  knowvn  as  building  and  loan
associations) had common roots and followved  fairly similar paths of development, at-least until thle  Great
Depression (Vittas 1992). They originated in the earl)y  terminating societies that appeared in Britain in the
second half of the eighteenth century and in the United States in the first half of the ninieteenth  century.  Tiie
early terminating institutions were followed in both countries by serial institutionls  and then by permanuent
institutions. In bothi  countries they suffered from fraud and mismanagement,  and the instruments used were  ! !'
very similar.
Early building societies in the United Kingdom and building and  loan associations in the United
States Nvere  created as cooperative ventures, established by relatively wvealthy  merchants. craftsmen, and
professionals to enable cooperative members to buy homes.  As terminating institutions, thev wvound  up
32their operations once all members achieved their goal.  Each memiiber  agreed to ma;ke  regular subscriptionis
until  a  relatively  large sum  of money  was collected.  This  rule  implied that these  institutionis were
established for relatively long periods (usually slightly less than twelve years, but rangincg  between ten and
fourteen years) and that members were able and willing to undertake long-term comimiitments.
An apt description of how terminating institutionis  opemted is given by tie  rules of the Oxford
Provident Building Association, whichi  was the first U.S. building society. founded in 1831 in Frankford.
Pemisylvania (Bodfish and Theobald 1938:30-39). This association also underscored tile commonl  roots of
thrift institutions in the twvo  countries, since the Oxford Provident Nvas  established by two Englishi-born
manufacturers and an English-born doctor in association with a lawvyer  and a school teacher, who also was a
survevor and convevancer. The rules of the Oxford Provident stipulated that members had to subscribe for
between one and five shares, each having par value of S500.  They  vere required to pay an initial S5 for
each share subscribed and theni  $3 a monthi  on each share.  A member was entitled to borrow $500 for each
share held.  \Vhenever $500 was accumulated in the treasury of the association, a loan of that amounit  was
offered to the member who bid the highest premium.  Loails were not made for buildinQl  houses more than
five miles from the market house in Frankford or outside of Philadelphia County, and no member in arrears
on his contributions or fines  vas allowed to bid for a loan. Borrowvers  vere charced a flat fee of $3 to cover
the costs of examiniilng  title papers and make disbursements in accordance with procrress  in the construction
of the house being financed. Borrowvers  were required to pay S2.50 a monthi  for the loan. equal to an annual
rate of interest of 6 percent, in addition to their $3 monthly contribution. A fine of 25 cents was imposed on
memilbers  who failed to pay their contribution and an additional 25 cents on borrowers who failed to pay
6~~~~~~~~
thieir mioiithly  interest.6
6The Oxford Provident had thirty-six members when it was organized w1ho  subscribed for a total of forty
shares (four members subscribed for two shares each and the others for one).  The highiest  premium bid for
the first loan was as muchi  as $10 but the first borrower, vho  was a lamplighter, was unable to keep up withDespite the problems they faced, the number of building societies increased quite rapidly, although
early records were far from comprehensive. Between 1780  and 1820 sixty-nine societies wvere  founded, and
in the ensuing fifty years more than 3,000 societies were created.  But because most societies were of the
terninating  type, only about 1,500  societies were operating in 1869. In the United States building and loan
associations grew  slowly at  first, but they  took off after the  1870s, becoming the  main type  of thrift
institution in most states outside of New England.  They experienced very rapid growth in the late  1880s,
their number increasing from around 2,000 in 1888  to more than 5,000 in 1893.
The great strengths of early societies were their mutual cliaracter and the hiigh  degree of mutual
trust among their members.  Every member was equally involved in the affairs of the society as lender,
borrower, and office holder (members took turns holding office).  Monthly meetings were held at inns and
were considered social events as well  as business meetings.  But earl)' building societies faced many
problems,  such as ensuringc  that members paid their dues, permitting witlhdrawals,  accommodating new
members, supplementing their funds witih  borrowing in order to accelerate the granting of mortgage loans,
utilizin,  surplus funds, and  so on.  Serial terminatina institutions provided a  partial answer to these
problems,  but  it was the  advent of  permanent building societies (and  permanent  building and  loan
associations) that enabled the separation of borrowers  and investors and allowed these institutions to extend
loans for fixed terms and to raise funds thlroughi  shares and deposits on different termns  and conditions.
But these innovations weakened tihe institutions' mutual character and gave rise to imprudent and
fraudulent behavior.  The history of building societies in the nineteenth century is replete with episodes of
his payments, and his membership, property, and obligations to the association were transferred to another
person. The Oxford Provident  was terminated in 1841, more or less as originialiv  planned. A second
Oxford Provident was almost immediately established with seventy-nine members and shares with a
reduced par value of $200 and monthly contributions of$1.  The second Oxford Provident  vas  terminated
in 1851 and was followed by a third one set up in 1852,  which  evolved into a serial association.
34such behavior and of changes in legislation that sought to establish better prudential standards.  With the
growth in the number of permanent societies, loans started to be made on security other than houses, with
some societies  providing advances against more speculative properties, such as factories.  Advances to
speculative builders were also made, exposing societies to considerable losses when builders went bankrupt.
Many societies borrowed excessive amounts to finance their operations.  Few of them had an adequate
capital structure or held enough of their assets in liquid form.  Because funds could be withdrawn  on
demand, severe problems were created when a society failed and depositors made a run on other societies.
Competition  led to even more  generous advances and less-careful selection of securities.  Geographic
diversification involved lending in distant locations, where lack of knowledge of local conditions created
problems with the evaluation of properties and assessment  of borrowers' credit-worthiness.
Accounting practices also left much to be desired.  In particular, the treatment of discounts on
advances created difficulties. Many societies gave advances to borrowers wilo accepted the largest discount
on the nominal amount of the advance.  These discounts were theni  treated as realized profit available for
distribution to members instead of being amortized over the life of the advance.  This practice had an
adverse impact on the long-term performance of societies because the returns to members in later years
were much  lower and because borrowers with speculative and more-risky ventures tended to offer the
largest discounts.
Several societies experienced an increase in fraudulent activities both internally (by officers) and
externally (by borrowers).  Lack of adequate supervision allowed directors and officers to take out society
funds for their personal use.  In some cases borrowers defrauded societies, usually by overstating the value
of properties, with the help of officials.  Outsiders, such as builders and solicitors, engaged in fraudulent
activities involving dummy purchasers and forged deeds.
35The advent of permanent building societies and building and loan associations was also associated
with a geographic expansion of operations that led to the emergence of "nationals," that is, institutions with
operations in several regions or states. Unlike savings banks and credit cooperatives in continental Europe.
building societies in the United Kingdom and savings and loan associations in the United States did not
establish a three-tier structure that would have allowed geographic diversification of risk without loss of
local  knowledge and  thus  obviated  the  need  for  nationals.  Nationals engaged  in  more  aggressive
competition and adopted sharper practices that in many cases involved outright fraud and mismanagement.
In Britain the most serious fraud involved the Liberator Society, a London-based society that had
risen to become the largest in the movement.  At the time of its failure in 1892, the Liberator was nearly
twice the size of its nearest rival.  In a situation reminiscent of the worst offenders in the savings and loan
debacle of the 1980s, the Liberator had only 2 percent of its mortgages in ordinary advances wlhen  it failed;
the vast majority were in second and third mortgages to companies controlled by its director.  The collapse
of the Liberator had an adverse impact on  the growth of building societies for many years to come.
Prudential controls were tightened further but geographic expansion and diversification were not banned.
In the United States nationals began to appear in the 1880s. Unlike most associations, wlhich  were
small, local institutions, they sought to attract funds by establishing branches throughout the United States
and by using aggressive advertising and selling techniques.  Not all nationals were outright frauds, but
typically they  were  promotional ventures for the  benefit of their  organizers.  They  used  misleading
advertisements  and  door-to-door selling  and  paid  high  commissions to  agents.  They  charged  stiff
membership fees and various expense fees for insurance and other overhead costs.  And they  imposed
heavy fines on late payers and profited from forfeiture of sums paid on lapsed shares.  Because they made
loans on extremely risky projects at very high interest rates and because they managed their assets poorly,
nationals were among the first to fail when the 1893  depression hit.
36The failure of the  largest national, the  Soutiern  Building and  Loan Association of Knoxville,
Tennessee in 1897, hiad  an adverse impact on the wvhole  movement.  Responding to strong complaints by
local associations, many states enacted regulations that required building and loan associations to confine
their operations  to  local  areas.  This  regulation was in  line  with the  geographic  limits imposed on
commercial bankls  and reflected widespread populist concems about out-of-state financial institutions. But
at the same time these rules  prevented savings and loan associations from geographiically  diversifying their
loan portfolios.
After the turn of the centurv and until the onset of the Great Depression, bothi  building societies and
savings and loan associations expanded rapidly, especially during the boom years of the 1920s. Institutions
in both countries refined their instruments in response to the volatility of interest rates caused by World War
I and the growinig  competition on deposits from commercial and savings banks.  During this period the use
of variable-rate mortgage loans started to spread, while strong emphiasis  was placed on promoting home
ownership and thrift.
At that time building societies and savings and loan associations xwere  the only types of lenders that
provided mortgage loanis  for maturities in excess of ten years, based on regular repayment, either through
the share-accuinulation-sink-ing-funid  miethod  or through reducing self-amortizing balance loans. Most other
lenders (commercial baniks,  savings banks, and insurance companies) provided loans for shorter periods, say
up to five years, with bullet repayment provisions and thus no regular amortization, and often withi  the right
of recall.  This practice has been attributed to the information and enforcement costs  that lenders faced
(Snowvdei and  Bu-Saba  1992).  These costs  wvere  loxvwe  for  building societies and savings  and  loan
associations in wvhich  members had some common bond.  And thus these institutions were better able to
increase tile maturity of their loans.
37Two  additional  factors  explaining this  difference include government  regulations,  especially
important in the United States, where commercial banks were not yet permitted to engage in longer-term
mortgages, and the orientation and marketing philosophies of commercial banks, which emphasized short-
term  lending.  Commercial banks had plenty of opportunities to expand their  loan portfolios  without
needing to focus on long-term mortgages.
Practice in the United States changed after the measures taken during the Great Depression.  These
included government insurance and guarantees for twenty-year and then thirty-year loans at fixed rates, a
practice that proved catastrophic for savings and loan associations in the 1970s and 1980s (Vittas 1992). In
the United Kingdom the large commercial banks continued to abstain from mortgage lending up to the late
1970s.  In large part this was caused by their reluctance to borrow short and lend long and their failure to
appreciate that lending long at variable rates, a practice that building societies had perfected over time,
avoided the interest rate exposures that concerned them most. Commercial banks changed their approach in
the 1980s, aided in part by the abolition of lending controls and the declining opportunities for grow  th  in
corporate lending-a  result of the advent of securitization  and other institutional  changes.
Credit Unions
Credit unions were developed in North America in the early part of the twentieth century.  They were
designed as an extension of the credit cooperatives that thrived in Germany at the end of the nineteenth
century. The term "credit union" is often used interchangeably  withi  "credit cooperative."  For the purposes
of this chapter, I distinguish credit unions by their orientation toward consumer credit (and more recently
38toward housing finance),  and credit cooperatives  bv their orientation  toward small traders, artisans,  and
farmers. 7
Credit unions were promoted  in North  America bv  Alphonlse Desjardins, who  founded  these
institutions in Quebec and other Canadian provinces and then established the first credit union in New
Hampshire in  1909.  Credit unions were created to provide more-convenient and  less-expensive credit
facilities to their members, wvho  were mostly salaried employees and factor)' workers.  Thley  were formed
on the basis of a common bond among their members, which lowered their monitoring costs.  Thev also
benefitted from low transaction costs because they often operated from offices and factories, not needing to
build extensive  networks or engage in expensive advertising  campaigns.  S
Credit unions were promoted hieavily  in Canada and the United States by their proponents, and they
to prospered because they provided small loans at reasonable interest rates and at  the same time paid
relatively high dividends on members' credit balances.  There were more than  1,300 credit unions in the
United States in 1930, holding less than S50 million in assets. But their number increased substantiallv after
World War 11. At one point there were more than 25,000 operating, but their number has declined in recent
years. Today there are slightly more than 12,000.
7But the distinction between credit cooperatives  and credit unions as well as that between credit
cooperatives is savings banks is difficult to establish in practice and may reflect differences in terminology
rather than function.
8To the extent that credit unions specialize in consumer credit they represent a formal extension of rotating
savings and credit associations. These are found in most countries, especially countries in the early staees
of financial development  and facilitate saving for relatively large consumer expenditures. Rotating savings
and credit associations involve a small number of individuals,  typically from six to forty, who pay a regular
amount on a periodic basis into a common pool that is then made available to each member in rotation.
Because of their small size, rotating savings and credit associations  rely on a common bond among
participants, often their place of employment or a neighborhood or membership of a local church or a local
club. Rotating savings and credit associations are often associated wvith  social gatherings, similar in concept
to the early, terminating building societies.
39In Canada there are nearly 1,100 credit unions.  Credit unions are much smaller in other Anglo-
American countries such as Australia and Ireland, and particularly small in the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, where they have been squeezed out by commercial banks (with large branch networks and a strong
retail presence), savings banks, and building societies.  Credit unions have not emerged as a distinct group
in continental  European countries, mainly  because their  activities have  been  subsumed  in  the  credit
cooperatives that also serve traders, artisans, and farmers.
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Evaluation  And Relevance For Developing Countries
Several factors shaped the emergence and growth of these  institutions in different countries, including
perceived gaps in financial markets, the institutions' rapid spread in neighboring and even distant countries,
the role of leadership with integrity and vision in promoting their establishment, the change in orientation in
the early stages of their development, and the operating efficiency and comparative advantage they enjoyed
over other institutions.
Common  Influentces
The general success and growth record of thrift deposit institutions in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and much
of the twentietlh  century suggest that the gaps in the market for financial services were real and that these
institutions had  the wherewithal to  make a  positive contribution to financial sector development.  The
perceived gaps in the supply of financial services emanated from the specialization of commercial banks in
dealing with industrial and commercial companies and their reluctance to seek the business of middle- and
low-income people or artisans, small traders, and farmers. Today, the unwillingness of commercial banks
to provide financial services to these groups is attributed to the problems caused by high information and
monitoring costs as well as the weak enforcement mechanisms that characterized these segments of the
40market in earlier periods.  The relative success of thrift deposit institutions is explained by their ability to
overcome these problems.
But an additional, and not necessarily exclusive, explanation holds that commercial banks found it
more  profitable  to  deal  wvith  the  business sector (and  wealthy  individuals)  and  did  not  have  the
organizational capacity and incentives to expand into small-fimi, household, or rural banking.  In other
words, given their financial and human resources, commercial banks had more than enough to do in trade
and working-capital finance.  They had little incentive to expand into more-risky activities, such as term
finance and mortgage banking, or in the mass banking business that required a much bigger investment in
infrastructure and would have swamped their facilities if it Nvas  pursued without expanding their branch
networks.
What was remarkable about the institutional  innovations seen in the different types of thrift deposit
institutions Nvas  their rapid spread in neighboring and  distant countries.  Today, the spread of ideas is
explained by the extensive communications links between different countries and  the globalization of
miarkets. Initiatives to create mutual funds and financial  futures markets around the world, let alone pension
iunds based on individual retirement accounts, are examples of how fast and how far new ideas can travel
these days.  Intemational acceptance of privatization and economic deregulation within less than fifteen
years is another example.  The work of institutions like the World Bank also contributes to the faster
propagation of these ideas. In earlier periods news traveled at a much slower pace and the rate of diffusion
was measured in decades rather than years.  But the spread Nvas  still quite remarkable given the mass
comimluniications  techinology  that prevailed at the time.
Individuals  that provided inspiration  and leadership in first creating and then propagating the spread
of different types of tlirift deposit institutions were crucially important in most countries. These individuals
were instrumental in establishinig  the fundamental principles of operation of different  institutions and in
41ensuring their success at the initial stages of their development. Of course there were individual leaders
who exploited these institutions for personal gain and who behaved imprudently and even fraudulently. But
once these institutions  wvere  %vell  established,  their survival was secured as long as they continued to serve a
useful purpose and as long as there 'vere enough managers with honesty and integrity to see the institutions
through temporary crises and enable them to resume their growth.  The experience of building societies in
the United Kingdom is characteristic in this respect.  Despite repeated crises and failures because of fraud
and mismanagement, the good forces in the movement were able to prevail in the long run and led building
i
societies to a very high level of achievement.
Another interesting featLre that was common among thrift deposit institutions was their change of
orientation at an early stage of development. Savings banks were created to encourage the poor to save, but
in most countries they quickly reoriented theirservices to middle-income  people and, if allowed, expanded
into lending.  In the United States savings banks became major lenders to large industrial firrns and had
very close links and extensive interlocking directorships  with commercial banks and insurance companies.
In Gennany savings banks became the baniks  of the middle classes and developed close relations with the
small and medium-size firms that are the backbone of German industrv.
Building societies and savings and loan associations also changed their orientation from being
formalized, long-term money clubs helping their members to acquire a house into institutions that promoted
thrift as well as home ownership. The fomial change in orientation came wvith  the advent of the permnanent
institutions that permitted the separation of;borrowers and investors. Credit cooperatives stayed closer to
their original orientation-providing  credit to their members-particularly  for as long as they maintained
ulimliilited  liability.  But after the adoption of limited liability, credit cooperatives became more similar to
other financial institutions, although1  still retaining a localized character, which was facilitated in Germany
and some other countries by their three-tier structure.
42Also common was the lower transaction  and  information  costs of thrift deposit institutions
compared  with other financial  institutions  (commercial  banks  or insurance  companies). Lower  transaction
costs  resulted  from  the use of unpaid  managers  and other  staff, particularly  in their  early years  of operation,
and the lack of a need  to build  expensive  infrastructures  or incur  other  operating  costs,  such as advertising
or publicity. Lower information  costs stemmed  from the local nature  of their operations  and the common
links among their members, which allowed them to overcome  the problems  caused by informnational
deficiencies and weak enforcement  mechanisms.  Lower information  costs implied lower operating
expenses  in screening  borrowers  anid  lower loan losses  from defaulting  borrowers. Together  with lower
transaction  costs,  they offered  much smaller spreads,  making  thrift deposit  institutions  more competitive
than traditional  moneylenders.  The comparative  advantage  of commercial  banks  and insurance  companies
lied more in making services available  (such as deposit facilities for low balances, long-tern credits,
including  housing  finance,  and so on) rather than in lower spreads  or lower loan  charges. An additional
competitive  advantage  was obtained  from the fiscal incentives,  particularly  the exemption  from income
taxes,  that thrift  deposit  institutions  had long  enjoyed  in most countries.
Differences  Among T7rift Deposit Institutions
Not all types of thrift  deposit institutions  thrived  in all countries  under  review. But even if they took root,
different  institutions  followed  different  development  paths in different  countries. Four main factors  may
account  for these differences. The first was the structure  of market gaps,  which was itself  the result  of a
dynamic interaction  between functions  and institutions. The second factor was related to the size and
distribution  of wealth. The  third factor  was  cultural  differences,  including  education  and literacy. And  the
fourth  factor  was differences  in organizational  approach,  especially  the presence  or absence  of the three-tier
structure.
43The  structure of market gaps and the  interaction betweeni fuLictionis  and  institutionis probably
explain why building societies and savings and loan associations thrived in the United Kingdom and the
United States, but not in continental Europe. They also explain wily, in contrast, credit cooperatives thrived
in Europe but not in Anglo-American countries.  Economists have argued that infomiationial  deficiencies
and weak enforcement mechanisms explain why commercial baniks vere  not more active in term finance
and mortgage banking or in dealing with artisans, farmers, and poorer houselholds. But this analysis does
not explain why commercial banks in Anglo-American countries did expand into some retail  banking
.;  i
business in the nineteenth century, wihile  those of continental Europe specialized almost exclusively in  vilat
could be called corporate or wholesale banking.
Considering  the organizational capacity of commercial banks in terms of their financial and humani
resources and their ability to respond to opportunities for profitable expansion provides another way to
explain the structure of market gaps. Thus, commercial banks in Anglo-American countries. where large
companies were able to obtain finance from nonbank sources, oriented themselves toward the retail market
and built relatively larger branch networks that allowed them to develop relations w ith smaller firms.  In
Central and northem European countries, in the absence of active securities markets and  other sources of
corporate finance, commercial banks maintained closer relations withi larger companies and  neglected
households and small and medium-size firms.
As a result there was greater scope for savings banks and credit cooperatives to emerge and grow"  in
continental Europe.  But once these institutions were established, there was less room for building societies
to take root and grow, as savings banks and credit cooperatives were able to fill the gap in the provision of
housing finance to relatively wealthy households.
In  the  United  Kingdom the  role  of  building  societies  was  strengthened  by  the  investment
restrictions that were imposed on the trustee savings banks. In France, although savings banks were equally
44restricted, another  type of institution-mortgage  credit  banks--vas  created to fill the gap  in mortgage
banking. As a result, building societies have always played a very small part in the French financial system.
Building societies have appeared in Germnany,  but despite benefiting  from large fiscal incentives, their role
has been secondary to that of mortgage credit banks and other thrift deposit institutions. Another example
of the effect of the sequencing of institutional innovations is the creation of the Post Office Savings Bank in
the United Kingdom and Ireland, which narrowed the scope for urban and rural credit cooperatives in these
two countries.
i
The  structure of market gaps and the  interaction between functions  and  institutions may  also
explain why, despite perennial criticisms of commercial banks in many Anglo-American countries for
failing to  provide adequate services to  small and medium-size firms, there have  not been any  serious
attempts to create mutual banks lending to such firms.  The scope for profitable operations by any such
banks *vould  clearly be restricted by the ability of lovv-risk  firms to bank with existing commercial banks
rather than join in a venture that would end up subsidizing high-risk firms.
In addition to the structure of market gaps, the size and distribution of wealth is also an important
deterrninant of scope, not only for thrift deposit institutions but for all types of financial services.  Poor
people seek a safe place to keep their meager savings. A postal savings bank with its convenient network of
post offices that maintains the real value of such savings would be the ideal institution. But as income and
wealtlh grow, demand for financial services increases and becomes more sophisticated.  One of the most
recent trends in the financial structure of OECD countries-the  growing relative importance of pension and
mutual funds-is  in many respects a reflection of the growth of the financial wealth of these countries.
The distribution of wealth also affects financial structure. In developing countries, where wealth is
higlhly  concentrated, the demand for the services of thrift deposit institutions is very small.  The distribution
of wealth also has implications for the organization of thrift deposit institutions.  For example, in Ireland
45attempts to create rural credit cooperatives with unlimited liability failed because large landowners were
reluctant to assume unlimited liability for the debts of small landowners.  As seen from the experience of
Germany, such cooperatives have a greater chance of success in communities with a more equal distribution
of land holdings.
The experience of rural credit cooperatives in Ireland also underscores the importance of cultural
factors. As discussed above, farmers in Ireland were allegedly reluctant to borrow from credit cooperatives
because they did not want their neighbors to know what their financial condition was.  In contrast, farmers
in Germany were happier borrowing from their local cooperative rather than applying for a loan from a
commercial or  savings  bank.  But  a  more  important aspect of cultural differences was  the apparent
reluctance of Irish farmers to deposit funds with the credit cooperatives  because they were afraid that when
their neighbors would find out about their deposits they wvould  ask them for a loan or at least to cosign a
loan. This reluctance to divulge details about financial  wealth appears to be important in poor communities
in Africa and Asia.
Another  cultural aspect  that affected the  operation of credit  cooperatives  in  Ireland was the
reluctance of members to impose strict discipline on defaulting borrowers.  This weakened the benefits of
peer monitoring and pressure in maintaining the low level of loan defaults and loan losses that characterized
rural credit cooperatives in continental Europe. In this respect it is important to note the emphasis placed on
literacy and education by the American Commission that investigated agricultural conditions in Europe.  A
high level of literacy and acceptance of the mutual benefits of peer monitoring and high loan repayment
rates are essential for the success of any type of thrift deposit institution. Although most proponents of such
institutions emphasize self-help and independence from government interference, they have accepted such
support for education and publicity.
46Cultural differences  probably also  explain the  emergence of the  three-tier  structure  in  most
European countries and  Canada,  where  the  credit  union movement has  been  strongly influenced  by
developments in Germany and France, and their absence in Anglo-American countries.  One of the great
strengths of thrift deposit institutions in continental Europe was the development of the three-tier structure.
Over time, this structure created of a kind of informal deposit insurance scheme whereby weak links in the
group would be rescued from failure but would be subject to strict discipline and the threat of expulsion if
internal controls were not acceptable.  This behavior was no different from that of the head office and
branches of a commercial bank.  The main difference lay in the greater autonomy of local institutions to
make decisions affecting their local market and therefore their greater identification with and support of
local developments. In Anglo-American countries the three-tier structure did not emerge, partly because of
the  antagonistic behavior of  most  leading institutions and  partly  because of  regulatory restrictions.
Regulatory restrictions were more important in the United States and resulted in a geographic concentration
of risk that was aggravated by the failure to prevent the assumption of large interest rate risks by most
savings and loan associations.  The fear of centralized power was also a factor, especially in the United
States, where even today credit union leaders oppose the creation of a three-tier structure.
Despite their differences, thrift deposit institutions were able to gain substantial market shares, not
only in the markets in which they specialized, such as mortgage loans or rural deposits, but also. in the
overall market for financial intermediation services.  But they have come under increasing pressure in
recent vears from four main sources.  First, changes in the size and distribution of financial wealth have
meant a growing demand for the services of pension and mutual funds. The clear implication of this trend
is that even if their size does not decline in absolute terms, thrift deposit institutions are bound to suffer a
decline in their relative importance.  Some of the markets they served so wvell  may be better served by
institutional investors, using new securitized instruments that are more suitable to their requirements than
47those of thrifts.  Second, the advent of securitization and loss of corporate business by commercial banks
has  prompted  a  reorientation toward  providing  retail  financial  services  to  both  smaller  firms  and
households, thus increasing the  competitive pressures on  thrifts.  Third, changes  in technology, both
transaction technology and information technology, have reduced, if not completely eliminated, the past
comparative advantages of thrift deposit institutions in this area. Fourth, concomitant changes in financial
regulation have removed the barriers between different  types of institutions. In fact, the right given to thrift
deposit institutions to diversify into other financial services has implied an increased demand for extemal
capital, which has been one of the factors motivating the recent spate of conversions into stock ownership.
And  diversification into new services has  further weakened the already flimsy link of  mutuality that
characterizes modem thrift deposit institutions.
Relevancefor Developing Countries
Most developing countries have established some type of thrift deposit institution, but achieved mostly
unsatisfactory  results. For example, postal savings banks have been created in most countries of Africa and
Asia.  In Africa postal savings have suffered from high inflation and high negative real interest rates that
have eroded the real value of deposits.  In Asia postal savings banks have met with considerable success in
some countries, but in other countries their record has been mediocre. Building societies have been formed
in former British colonies in both Africa and Asia, and savings and loan associations in Latin America. But
again their perforrnance has been poor, suffering from the effects of high inflation and low recovery rates.
Finally, credit cooperatives and  credit unions have been tried in many  developing countries, but their
performance  has  suffered  from  low  availability of  external  funds-funds  not  mobilized  by  their
membership-and  from poor monitoring of loans.  Savings banks and credit cooperatives exist  in most
former socialist countries of Eastem Europe, where their roots date from the precommunist era.  But their
48operations and performance bear little resemblance  to the original function of these banks. In most socialist
countries savings banks had monopoly power over household banking, wvhile  credit cooperatives operated
as branches of a state-control  led central agricultural bank.
Despite  their poor record,  thrift  deposit institutions can still ma;ke a  positive contribution  to
financial sector  and  economic development in  developing countries.  Thus  provided macroeconomic
policies succeed in lowering inflation to moderate levels, postal savings bankis  could mobilize deposits from
poorer areas where there may be fewv,  if any, commercial bank branches. Housing finance institutions could
still be a useful institution in countries where the commercial  banks are oriented towvard  the corporate sector
and mortgage securitization may take some time to develop.  Rural credit cooperatives could play a large
part in providing financial services and distributing credits to small farmers, again, especially in countries
wvhere  commercial banks have small branch networks and are unlikelv to be successful in accessing these
markets.
Many  developiig  countries have  created  institutions that  specialize in  lending  to  the  poor,
especially in rural areas. Examples include the wvell-knowvn  Grameen Bank-  in Bangladesh, the Bank Rakyat
Indonesia and its Unit Desa network in Indonesia,  the Banco de Desarrolto (a bank created and funded by
the Catholic Church)  in Chile, Finagro in Ecuador, reorganized credit  unions  in Guatemala, and  the
stockvels in South Africa. But much more needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of such institutions
in reaching the poor in rural areas and in helping small farmers, artisans, and traders.
The experience of developed countries with thrift deposit institutions suggests that five elements  r
should be included in any integrated program to build solid and successful institutions. The first element is
strong leadership. This implies that support should be given to those groups, such as the Clhurch or local
officials. that are likely to attract people wvith  high ideals, integrity,  and commitment to the success of these
institutions.
49The second element is the creation of a three-tier structure. The third element is a strong emphasis
on education and dissemination of information about the workings and benefits of these institutions.  As
was seen from the experience of Ireland, culture can be an important obstacle to the success of thrift deposit
institutions.
The fourth, and perhaps most important, element is the encouragement of active peer monitoring
and enforcement of contractual obligations.  While the principle of unlimited liability may not be viable in
most developing countries, government policies could strengthen monitoring and enforcement processes by
providing financial support only to regional units and local institutions that have a good record of loan
repayment.
Finally, official policy toward thrift deposit institutions must encourage self help and avoid total
reliance  on  external funding.  External support  could be  made  dependent  on  the  level of  resource
mobilization attained by each local institution  as well as on its record of monitoring and repayment.
Of course, the recent trends  of financial systems in  industrial countries toward securitization,
pension funds, and mutual funds; reorientation of commercial banks toward the household and small-firms;
and new transaction and information technologies will eventually affect financial systems in developing
countries.  The new financial, technological, and regulatory environments that are likely to emerge will
limit the scope for some thrift deposit institutions. Nevertheless, given the prevalence of poverty and the
underdevelopment of financial infrastructure in most developing countries, the need for institutions that
specialize in offering banking services to the poor is likely to persist for a long time.
50References
Bodfish  and Theobald
Bonin, Hubert. 1992.  Le Credit Agricole de la Gironde, la Passion du7ne  Region, 1901-1991.  Bordeaux:
Editions L'Horizon Chimerique.
Born. Karl Erich.  1983.  International Banking in the 19th and 20th Centuries.  Leanington  Spa: Berg
Publishers Limited.
Cahill, J. R.  1913. Report to the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries of an I7quiry into Agricultural Credit
andAgriculural  Cooperation  in Germany. London: HMSO.  -
Cleary, Edmond John. 1965. Th7e  Building Society Mlovement. London: Elek Books.
Davis, Lance E.  1960.  "The New England Textile Mills and the Capital Mark-ets:  A Study of Industrial
Borrowing 1840-1860." The  Jouirnal  of Economic History, 20(March):  1-30.
Davis, Lance E. 1961. "Mrs. Vatter on Industrial Borrowing: A Reply."  The  Jouzral of Economic History,
2  1  (June):225.
Davis, Lance E., and Peter L. Payne.  1958.  "From Benevolence to Business: The Story of Two Savings
Banks." Business HistoryReviewv  32(Winter):386-406.
Guininane,  Timothy W. 1993.  "Cooperatives as  Ihformation Mlachines:  Tle Lending Practices of Germat7n
Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, 1883-1914."  Economic Growvth  Center, Yale University, New Haven.
Colli. August.
Guinnane, Timothy  W. 1994a.  "A Failed Institutional Transplant: Raiffeisen's Credit Cooperatives  in
Ireland, 1894-1914." Explorations in Economic History 31  (  ):38-61.
Guinnane, Timothy W. 1  994b. "Diversification,  Liquidity and Supervision  for Sn7all  Financial Institutions:
Regional  Banks  and  Auditing  Associations for  Vineteentlh Century German  Credit Cooperatives."
Department of Economics, Yale University, Newv  Haven,  Conn. March.
Metcalf and Black.  1915.  Report to the Governor and Legislature of the State of Washington  on Rural
Credit, Cooperation an7d  Agricullural Organization in Europe.  Olympia: Frank  M.  Lambom  Public
Printer.
Olsmtead, Alan L. 1972.  "Investment Constraints and New York City Mutual Savings Bank Financing of
Antebellum Development." T1e  Jourinal  ofEconomic History 34(December):  811-840.
Olmstead, Alan L.  1974.  "New York  City Mutual Savings Bank Portfolio Management and  Trustee
Objectives." The  Journal of Economic History, 34(December):8  15-834.
51Olmstead, Alan L. 1976. New )ork City Mutual Savings Banks, 1819-1861.  Chapel Hi  lIl:  The Un  iversity of
North  Carolina  Press.
Payne, Peter  Lester, and  Lance  Edwin Davis.  1956.  The Savings Bank  of Ballirore,  1818-1866-A
Historical and Analytical Study.  Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Vatter, Barbara. 1961. "Industrial Borrowing  by the New England Textile Mills, 1  840-1860: A Comment."
The  Joutrnal  ofEconomic History 21  (June):2  16-2  1.
Vittas, Dimitri.  1992.  "Thrift Regulation in the United Kingdom and the  United States-A  Historical
Perspective." Financial Policy and Systems Division, World Bank, Washington, D.C. September.
Vittas, Dimitri. 1978. Banking Systems Abroad: The Role of lIrge Deposit Banks in the  Financial Systems
of Germany, France, Italy, tfe ANetlerlands,  Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, and the United States.  London:
Inter-Bank Research Organization.
52Table  9.1
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France  Germaniy  Italy  Japan  Netherlan  Sweden  Switzerlan  U.K.  U.S.
7.3
Cenlral bank  8.3  5.4  8.1  4.3  6.6  7.0  3.9  4.2
16.5
Large commn.  banks  18.1  7.8  17.4  20.5  15.2  24.4  17.0  15.2
4.9
Other comm. banks  11.5  7.5  12.8  12.9  3.8  3.6  11.7  20.3
27.1
Savings banks  14.2  29.0  18.6  6.1  5.0  14.5  3.1  5.6
Postal savings  10.9  2.0  8.7  9.4  7.4  2.2  1.7
2.5
Credit co-ops  16.0  9.4  8.4  19.8  12.2  2.9  - -
Btuildinig  soc.  - 5.8  - - - - 17.9  14.5
Clredlil  tilli 0s  - - - - - - - 1.7
29.6
All Thrifts  41.1  46.2  35.7  35.3  24.6  19.6  22.7  21.8
1.3
Long-termi  Cls  8.2  12.8  9.1  11.0  5.0  2.8  4.9  5.5
12.1
InsUrance  cos  8.8  11.9  . 3.1  8.2  12.8  15.7  21.9  14.6
23.1
P'ensioni  ftunds  - - - 7.8  26.6  25.5  11.1  12.9
4.8
Mutual  funds  2.5  1.4  0.3  - 2.4  - 6.5  2.3
0.4
Ollter inst.  0.5  7.()  3.5  - 3.0  - 0.2  3.2
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